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The role of client organizations in the human resource management of agency 
workers: evidence from English health and social care services 
 
 
Abstract 
It is frequently argued that the growing reliance on agency workers in core organizational roles 
leads to significant risk for client organizations. It has also been suggested that while this risk 
can be mitigated through investments in human resource (HR) practices directed at agency 
workers, in reality these will be hard to develop or implement. This paper draws upon Lepak and 
Snell’s (1999) HR architecture model and uses a comparative case study method to explore this 
issue, focusing on agency working in core nursing and qualified social worker roles. The 
findings illustrate how client organizations can become more involved in the HR management of 
agency workers than has previously been acknowledged in the literature. Our analysis also 
identifies the conditions that shape this client-side involvement, including the nature of agency 
worker contracts, the role of temporary work agencies, competing organizational cost-control 
priorities and perceptions of the regulatory context. These conditions are brought together in a 
general model for understanding the largely neglected role that client organizations play in the 
HR management of agency workers in core organizational roles.  
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Introduction 
In most developed economies, a well-documented trend in recent years has been the increase in 
job roles filled through temporary work agencies (TWAs) (Cappelli & Keller, 2013; Voss et al., 
2013). This is often viewed as positive for employers (Osnowitz, 2010; Galais & Moser, 2009), 
with agency workers being used to adjust to tight labor markets (Houseman et al., 2003) and 
provide a way of acquiring specialist skills and knowledge (Matusik and Hill, 1998). Indeed, it is 
argued that by importing ‘waves of fresh ideas and approaches’ agency workers may ‘help 
prevent the organization becoming insular and complacent…’ (Storey et al., 2002: 4). At the 
same time, however, an increasing reliance on agency workers is not without certain risks for 
employers (Bonet et al., 2013; Bidwell, 2009). As with other forms of outsourced labor, there 
may be ‘particular complexities in supervisory, reporting, and other interpersonal relationships 
that may lead to problems including turnover, lack of loyalty, service discontinuities, and poor 
service quality’ (Fischer et al., 2008: 502).  
This raises the question of how organizations that use agency workers should respond to 
these risks. As Torka (2011) argues, agency workers’ commitment and performance can be 
strongly influenced by the treatment and support they receive. This, in turn, has led to the 
suggestion that client organizations themselves might become more involved in the human 
resource (HR) management of their agency workforce (Koene et al., 2014; Zimmerman et al., 
2013). Doing so, it is argued, will help to strengthen ‘reciprocal commitment obligations’ 
(Schlosser et al., 2006: 299) between client organizations and agency workers, and thereby avoid 
some of the risks associated with ‘socially thin’ employment relationships (Koene & van 
Riemsdijk, 2005: 84).  
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Such client-side interventions might be deemed especially important when agency 
workers are deployed in ‘inner core’ roles (Peel & Boxall 2005) that generate high value for 
organizations (Lepak and Snell, 1999). In these situations, client organizations may be exposed 
to increased risks arising from agency workers’ lack of organization-specific knowledge (Author 
B and Author A, 2008) and lack of willingness to engage in ‘work related helping behaviours’ 
(Broschak and Davis-Blake, 2006). In theory, managing risk in these situations may even require 
the development of high involvement HR systems (Appelbaum et al., 2000), emulating those 
often used for permanent employees.  
A key question, however, concerns the feasibility of such client-side interventions, when 
labor has effectively been outsourced. To date, research on this topic has been limited. Although 
part of the ‘triangular employment relationship’ (Davidov, 2004) with TWAs and agency 
workers, client organizations are often depicted as playing a largely passive role, being either 
unwilling or unable to contribute to the HR management of agency workers. In this paper, we 
explore how far this is the case, and the factors that shape or influence client-side investments in 
HR practices targeted at agency workers in core roles.  
In doing so, the paper focuses on two areas of the UK’s public sector: National Health 
Service (NHS) acute hospital trusts; and local authority social care departments. Both cases 
explore the HR management of agency workers in core roles (nursing and qualified social 
workers respectively). Under ideal conditions, one might expect such roles to be staffed using 
standard permanent employment contracts (Lepak and Snell, 1999). However, as discussed 
below, largely as a result of powerful supply-side pressures, employers in both instances have 
increasingly had to rely on TWAs to fill these positions (Cornes et al., 2013). As such, these 
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cases are illustrative of high-risk situations where, in theory at least, there is a greater incentive 
for client organizations to invest in the HR management of agency workers.  
In what follows, we first examine the extant literature on the client-side management of 
agency workers, drawing upon Lepak and Snell’s (1999) HR architecture model as a framing 
device, before outlining the research approach adopted and presenting the findings. The paper 
concludes by presenting a process model concerning the client-side management of agency 
workers in core organizational roles that has the potential to advance both the literature and 
management practice. 
 
Client-side HR management of agency workers: literature review  
The case for client-side HR management of agency workers  
A useful starting point when theorising the investments client organizations might make in the 
HR management of agency workers is Lepak and Snell’s (1999) ‘human resource architecture’ 
model. The model is based upon two central dimensions: the value of human capital, which is 
‘inherently dependent upon its potential to contribute to the competitive advantage or core 
competence of the firm’ (Lepak and Snell, 1999: 35); and the uniqueness of human capital, in 
terms of its degree of asset specificity. These dimensions, in turn, pose critical choices for 
organizations concerning the ‘employment modes’, ‘employment relationships’ and ‘HR 
configurations’ they adopt for job roles requiring different forms of human capital. Within the 
model, ‘core’ roles (comprising both valuable and unique human capital) are seen as requiring an 
‘internal development’ employment mode involving permanent employment coupled with 
‘organizational’ employment relationships and a ‘commitment-based’ HR configuration. This is 
similar to Appelbaum et al.’s (2000) Ability, Motivation and Opportunity to Participate (AMO) 
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model, comprising: skill-enhancing practices including recruitment, selection, and training; 
motivation-enhancing practices including performance appraisal, compensation, incentive, 
benefits, promotion, career development, and job security; and opportunity-enhancing practices 
including job design, work teams, employee involvement and information sharing. Other roles 
requiring less valuable and/or unique human capital are seen in Lepak and Snell’s (1999) model 
as best managed via either an ‘acquisition’, ‘alliance’ or ‘contracting’ employment mode. 
Within this framework, agency working, which essentially involves the outsourcing of 
labor, can be classified as a ‘contracting’ or ‘acquisition’ employment mode. The latter is 
especially relevant where agency workers are used in knowledge roles or professional positions, 
where human capital is valuable but – because it is transferable – also widely available in the 
labour market. In this situation, the client organization will establish a ‘symbiotic employment 
relationship based on the utilitarian premise of mutual benefit’ (Lepak and Snell 1999: 38). This 
involves a trade-off whereby expert workers (contracted through TWAs) use their transferable 
skills to command higher financial returns. In return ‘[client] organizations expect a certain 
degree of loyalty to the firm while the relationship exists’ (pp 38-39). While agency workers 
might have low affective commitment to the organization, it is assumed that this temporary 
loyalty will be sufficient to ensure a productive relationship during the tenure of the contract. 
This bargain may be further reinforced by the adherence of agency workers to professional 
standards (linked to re-certification demands, for example) and their need to maintain their 
reputation in the labor market (Barley and Kunda, 2004).  
Implied by the above is that client organizations will also adopt an HR configuration that 
is ‘market based’, focused on ‘staffing and deploying skills for immediate contribution’ (Lepak 
and Snell 1999: 39), while withholding ‘long-horizon investments’ (Krausert, 2014: 69) in the 
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development of agency workers. Such a configuration is deemed appropriate as client 
organizations ‘have little incentive to train [agency] employees beyond the skills needed to 
perform their current job, as they will not have the chance to capitalise on their investment’ 
(Bonet et al., 2013: 370). Instead, client organizations are advised to focus primarily on 
developing an effective ‘system of selective staffing and rewards’ (Lepak and Snell, 1999: 39).  
However, the suggestion that agency workers should be managed by a ‘market-based’ 
HR configuration under an ‘acquisition’ employment mode (or a ‘compliance’ HR configuration 
under a ‘contracting’ employment mode) has been questioned within the literature. In any 
context, there is a risk that the relative neglect of agency workers by client organizations may 
exaggerate the risks of sub-standard performance (Zimmerman et al. 2013; Koene & van 
Riemsdijk, 2005). Feldman et al. (1994: 54) note, for example, the problems that arise when 
agency workers become ‘discouraged by the dehumanising and impersonal way that they are 
treated on the job’. 
It is likely that these problems will be even more pronounced in situations where agency 
workers are used in core organizational roles that require both valuable and unique human 
capital. As discussed above, Lepak and Snell’s (1999) model assumes that core roles will be 
staffed via an internalisation strategy in which permanent employees are managed by a 
‘commitment HR configuration that nurtures employee involvement and maximises the firm’s 
return on human capital investments’ (p.37). Yet, this might not always be possible, especially if 
agency workers have a preference for the flexible ‘portfolio’ or ‘protean’ careers that TWAs 
provide (Galais and Moser, 2009). These supply-side pressures will arguably make it harder for 
employers to recruit to core permanent roles, thereby forcing them into an ‘acquisition’ 
employment mode by default.  
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Hence, there are reasons to suggest that ‘acquisition’ strategies may be sub-optimal and 
that, on balance, client organizations are better served by making their own investments in the 
management of agency workers (Zimmerman et al. 2013).  Indeed, a growing number of studies 
highlight the importance for agency worker commitment of perceived organizational support and 
the adoption of HR practices similar to those applied to permanent staff (Torka, 2011; Torka and 
Schyns, 2010: 1307; Liden et al. 2003; Coyle-Shapiro et al. 2006). In practice, this could mean 
‘providing temporary agency workers with better training and education programmes, clear 
expectations of the temporary assignment…to increase the job quality and fully exploit the 
benefits of a flexible workforce’ (Mitlacher, 2008: 455). According to Fischer et al. (2008: 507), 
client firms might ‘effectively leverage outsourced labor’ by utilising ‘HR tools’ to deal with the 
challenges posed by difficult employee transitions, performance management and high agency 
worker turnover.  
In short, the message is that client organizations need to consider developing a ‘special 
attention’ approach (Koene & van Riemsdijk, 2005) for the management of agency workers. As 
noted, this is especially when these workers are used in core roles, where ‘synergistic interaction 
between itinerant professionals and organizations is essential for organizational development and 
competitiveness’ (Koene et al., 2014: 4). 
 
The feasibility of client-side investments in the HR management of agency workers   
Notwithstanding the above, how feasible is it for client organizations to invest in the HR 
management of agency workers? Previous research has shown that although line managers on 
the client side may become involved in the day-to-day supervision of agency workers (Pearce, 
1993; Bidwell, 2009), this will rarely, if ever, extend to more co-ordinated (or deliberately-
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targeted) HR management (Bonet et al., 2013). In practice, any management that takes place is 
effectively delegated to co-workers who ‘perform these tasks out of necessity or frustration or 
both’ (Davis-Blake & Broschak, 2000: 106).   
There are a number of reasons why this might be the case. As we have noted already, the 
perceived need for such investment is likely to depend on the type of roles filled by agency 
workers (this need being greater when they are used in core areas). Client organizations’ 
perceptions of need may also be influenced by their relationships with TWAs. It is possible that 
TWAs will focus mainly on cost minimization (Author B et al., 2008) and may be unwilling or 
(for commercial reasons) unable to engage in ‘“value adding” HRM’ (Knox, 2014: 94). However 
where deeper ‘partnerships’ emerge between TWAs and client organizations, the former may 
assume greater responsibility for HR management (Bidwell & Fernandez-Mateo, 2010; Nesheim 
et al., 2007). For example, Hakansson & Isidorsson (2012) note instances of close partnerships 
leading to ‘all core’ staffing strategies, with highly-skilled agency professionals (such as IT 
specialists) being treated essentially as long-term, regular employees. In these situations, where 
TWAs actively invest in HR management and view this as a ‘shared responsibility’ (Torka, 
2011), the pressures on client organizations to get involved may be less pronounced.  
In addition, even if client organizations perceive the need to develop HR practices, there 
may be a number of conditions that restrict their willingness (and ability) to do so. Despite the 
arguments above regarding the benefits of ‘on-boarding’ agency workers (Fischer et al., 2008), 
investing more resources in the HR management of this group may be harder to justify when 
their numbers are lower and contract duration is shorter (Stanworth & Drucker, 2006). The 
regulatory context may also be important. While in some countries (such as the US) the client is 
defined as the agency worker’s legal employer, in others (including continental Europe and 
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increasingly the UK) it is the TWA (Voss et al., 2013). In the latter cases, client organizations 
may take the view that responsibility for the management of agency workers (and not just 
‘payroll’ functions) should be ‘outsourced’ to the TWA (Davidov, 2004: 727). 
Finally, internal politics within client organizations may influence their ability to make 
targeted investments in the HR management of agency workers. According to Ward et al. 
(2001), decisions about the use of agency staff are often influenced by a variety of competing 
demands (such as cost reduction or reducing staff headcount for accounting purposes), which 
may or may not be consistent with the goals of a high commitment HR strategy. The legacy of 
prior policy decisions and mind-sets with regard to agency workers may further hinder the 
development of such policies, especially in situations where agency workers have previously 
been viewed as a ‘disposable’ as opposed to a ‘renewable’ resource (Davis-Blake and Broschak, 
2000).  
Hence, the literature is divided on how far and under what conditions client organizations 
might invest in the HR management of agency workers. There is a growing understanding of the 
potential benefits of HR investments in mitigating the risks associated with agency worker use 
(Mitlacher, 2008; Zimmerman et al., 2013). However, it is also noted that client-side investments 
are far from the norm (Bonet et al., 2013) and that there may be significant barriers to making 
them (Davidov, 2004; Torka, 2011). In what follows, we address these issues by drawing upon 
data from illustrative cases of agency working in UK acute hospitals and social services. 
Specifically, we explore two questions. First, how and in what ways do client organizations 
invest in the HR management of agency workers in core organizational roles? Second, what are 
the factors that shape or influence these investments? In addressing these questions, we build on 
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the nascent literature and develop a process model to provide guidance to both academics and 
practitioners.   
 
Study setting, data and method 
Study setting: agency working in health and social care  
The organizations on which the analysis is based are drawn from English acute hospital trusts 
(forming part of the National Health Service (NHS)) and local authority-run social services. 
Although both are part of the public sector (funded from direct taxation), there are notable 
differences in the size and organizational structure of these services. At the time of the research, 
local government administration in England consisted of 152 local authorities, each with 
responsibility for providing social care services for adults, families and young people (the latter 
usually merged with education). Professional social workers and occupational therapists (the 
workers relevant to the research) made up approximately 20 per cent of a social care workforce 
of over 250,000. By contrast, the NHS is a much larger organization than any of the local 
authorities, with a total workforce in excess of 1.3 million, including over 400,000 qualified 
nursing, midwifery and health visiting staff. In England, hospital services (the focus in this 
paper) are provided by acute and tertiary health trusts. The majority of the workforce in both 
social care and health is female. 
As well as being numerically large in employment terms, qualified social workers and 
nurses are also unambiguously part of the ‘inner core’ of social and health services. While 
generic professional knowledge acquired through formal education is the basis for entry to these 
professions, effective performance requires extensive organization and client group-specific 
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knowledge. The interdependent nature of tasks associated with child protection and the running 
of hospital wards also means that there is a heavy emphasis on team-working in both professions.   
For these reasons, employment in both sectors has historically been strongly associated 
with bureaucratic models of employment and a reliance on internal labor markets (De Ruyter et 
al., 2008), while the use of contingent contracts has been limited to occasional locums supplied 
mainly through in-house staff ‘banks’. More recently, however, there has been a marked growth 
in agency working in both sectors. In social care, this has been an enduring trend since the mid-
1990s. Agency working had risen to an average of 7.3 per cent of all social workers in local 
authorities by 2012 (12 per cent in London), (Schraer, 2014). In the NHS, the reliance on agency 
workers has increased even more dramatically over the past two decades. Agency staffing costs 
in the NHS were only £35 million in 2000-1, but had risen to £883 million by 2007-8 (Hurst & 
Smith, 2011: 288). This trend continued in subsequent years, with expenditure on temporary and 
agency staff rising by another 20 per cent in 2013/14 (Lafond et al., 2014). In both sectors, it is 
important to note that a significant proportion of this expansion in agency working has been 
supply-led, with nurses and social workers voluntarily opting for agency contracts, which they 
view as offering higher financial rewards, greater flexibility and improved work-life balance (De 
Ruyter et al., 2008).   
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this greatly-increased use of agency nurses and qualified social 
workers in core service roles has led to growing concerns about both rising TWA fees and 
potentially negative consequences for service quality (Cornes et al., 2013). To address these 
concerns, there have been calls to re-evaluate the manner in which agency workers are treated 
once in role. Manthorpe et al. (2012: 127), for example, argue that ‘it may often be the poor 
management of agency workers rather than agency working itself which poses a risk to service 
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users’, while Hurst & Smith (2011: 289) have called for better orientation, training, performance 
monitoring and general support of agency staff. But despite these calls, little research has been 
conducted on client organizations’ investments in developing such practices, or the factors that 
shape or influence these investments. 
  
Data and methods  
The research design follows what Meyer and Lunnay (2012) describe as an ‘abductive’ logic in 
which the goal is to refine and develop theory. As with a deductive approach, abduction moves 
from theory to data, although much greater emphasis is placed upon incorporating insights from 
data that lie outside the initial theoretical frame. Specifically, this means taking propositions 
gleaned from the literature and then refining these propositions iteratively as the data analysis 
unfolds. The focus on multiple, comparative case studies (see below) was also informed by this 
logic, the aim being to pursue theoretical generalizability. Using this approach, our aim was to 
refine and develop extant theorizing on agency working: first, by mapping the types of HR 
practices adopted by client organizations; and second, by exploring the factors shaping their 
development, in order to ultimately develop a process model outlining the factors influencing 
client-side involvement in the HR management of agency workers. 
The data were derived from a study conducted in two stages. The first stage consisted of 
exploratory interviews with representatives of various peak (national-level) organizations 
(including the NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency (PASA)
 
and the Recruitment and 
Employment Confederation (REC)). The second and main stage of the research comprised case 
studies of three NHS acute trusts and three local authorities, all located in greater London. 
Adopting a logic of ‘critical case sampling’ (Patton, 1990), the focus on London was deliberate 
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as it is here that agency working is most pronounced (Hurst & Smith, 2011; Manthorpe et al., 
2012) and where client involvement in managing agency staff is arguably most likely. The cases 
were also selected to reflect differences in organizational form that were likely to shape the 
management of agency workers.  
As demonstrated by Table 1, the six cases varied by the size of their full-time equivalent 
workforce. Where the hospital trusts (HT) were concerned, two university training hospitals 
(HTs A and B) and one tertiary (or specialist) hospital (HT(C)) were included. With regard to the 
three local authorities, geography is a key factor influencing the nature of client groups (for 
example, demographic and economic variations) and labor markets, with implications for staff 
turnover and pressures to use agency workers. Reflecting this, one authority was selected from 
inner London (SC(B)) and two from outer London (SC(A) and SC(C)). Lastly, these two sectors 
also illustrated different contractual arrangements with TWAs, with ‘partnership’ arrangements 
being more advanced in health than in social care (see below).  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
In line with the national trends discussed above, all the case study organizations were 
making significant use of agency workers in core organizational roles (see Table 1). This was 
explained largely by supply-side pressures, linked to the need to cover ‘hard-to-fill’ permanent 
vacancies. Specifically, opportunities to earn more and benefit from flexible working patterns 
had influenced many nurses and social workers to opt for agency contracts.  
 In each case, the research focused on the full spectrum of actors involved in the agency 
worker supply chain. As can be seen from Appendices 1 and 2, 59 interviews were conducted, 
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with women comprising the majority of respondents. On average, the interviews lasted one hour, 
were all recorded and fully transcribed and the data were systematically content-analysed by two 
members of the research team (see below). In all cases, interviews were semi-structured and 
explored a list of core themes. Where client-side managers were concerned, five main themes 
were addressed: the current use of agency workers; reasons for their use; method of agency 
worker procurement; the impact of agency workers on service outcomes; and their management. 
Interviews with agency workers addressed their experiences of work within client organizations 
and of their TWA, while interviews with TWAs focused on contractual relationships and their 
involvement (if any) in HRM activities.  
Data analysis unfolded over three stages, involving: first, a systematic comparison of 
interviews and documentary sources within cases; second, comparisons between cases within 
each sector; and lastly, a comparison of sectors (health and social care). Consistent with an aim 
of theory elaboration, data analysis involved a mix of deductive and inductive strategies. The 
deductive elements focused on broadly categorizing aspects of the data, within and between 
cases, in accordance with our primary research questions. This was then followed by further 
content analysis, including the use of grounded theory analytical techniques (Gioia et al., 2011), 
to identify more specific, second order constructs. For the first research question, our initial 
analysis revealed the implementation of a wide variety of HR practices, not all of which were 
easily comparable within and across different cases. To address this concern, a decision was 
taken to classify these practices according to their intended impact, using the Appelbaum et al. 
(2000) Ability, Motivation and Opportunity to Participate (AMO) model outlined earlier as a 
heuristic. For our second research question, categories were developed that built on the factors 
explored in the literature review concerning client organizations’ perceptions of the need to 
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invest in the HR management of agency workers, and their ability and willingness to do so. 
Differences in interpretation – notably between client managers and respondents from TWAs 
concerning the effectiveness of different HR practices – were handled by drawing on the 
accounts of agency workers themselves. For both research questions, the process of analysis 
involved moving back and forth between the data and the literature to refine emerging categories, 
and also extensive cross-referencing between the two members of the research team who carried 
out this work. .  
In what follows, the results are presented in two main sections. In the first of these we 
address the paper’s first research question by exploring the range of HR practices adopted by the 
case organizations. Building on the analysis mentioned above, these practices cohered around the 
three main dimensions of Appelbaum et al.’s (2000) AMO model. In the second section, we 
explore the factors that influenced the development of these interventions. 
 
Findings 
Client investments in the HR management of agency workers 
With regard to the paper’s first research question (how and in what ways do client organizations 
invest in the HR management of agency workers in core organizational roles?), our analysis 
revealed a range of HR practices targeted at agency workers in both the health and social care 
cases. A detailed summary of these practices is provided in Tables 2a and 2b, with illustrative 
examples and supporting extracts from the data. Following the Appelbaum et al. (2000) 
framework outlined above, these HRM interventions had broad relevance to managing agency 
workers’ ability, motivation and opportunity to participate. For example, under ability were a 
variety of practices aimed at providing induction and more specialist training for agency 
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workers, while under motivation attention was paid to performance appraisal and supervision, 
especially in social care. Measures aimed at extending ‘opportunity to participate’ were more 
limited, but included efforts to improve communication and consultation with agency workers. 
The existence of these practices arguably points to a more co-ordinated and planned approach 
towards the HR management and development of agency workers by client organizations than is 
normally assumed in the literature. While previous studies have emphasised a paucity of HR 
management (Bonet et al., 2013), in our cases we found evidence of deliberate and planned HR 
practices.   
 
TABLES 2a AND 2b ABOUT HERE 
 
However, when drawing these conclusions it is important to note two main caveats. First, 
the development of HR practices was greater in the social care cases than in health. This was 
most notably true with regard to the provision of training opportunities and supervisory support, 
both of which were more formalised in the social care organizations. 
Second, while the HR practices were more coordinated and planned than found in 
previous studies (especially in terms of intent), it was nevertheless apparent that actual 
implementation within the case study organizations was  uneven, raising questions about their 
coverage and impact. A Ward Sister at HT(C), for example, explained that while induction 
represented “good practice”, it was “not consistent across this trust” (HT(C)-7). Similarly, in 
social care, managers noted how induction could be erratic and shorter than that provided to 
permanent staff (SC(C)-5) and how the training offered was often limited in nature (SC(A)-6). 
As such, the HR interventions we observed fell short of the kind of strategic approach to agency 
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working envisaged by some observers (Koene et al., 2014). Reflecting this, these HR initiatives 
had been largely developed bottom-up at local level by individual line managers. By contrast, 
there was little evidence of strategic leadership (or even involvement) on the part of the HR 
function in the development and introduction of these HR interventions. The focus of the HR 
function in all the case study organizations remained largely on the management of directly-
employed workers.  
 
Conditions shaping client organizations’ investments in the HR management of agency workers 
In this section, we turn to the paper’s second research question (what are the factors that shape or 
influence client organizations’ HR investments?). In particular, we seek to account for the 
uneven development and implementation of HR practices both within and between the two 
sectors. In doing so, we make a broad distinction between factors that influenced client 
organizations’ perceived need (and therefore demand) for investments in the HR management of 
agency workers and those which constrained their willingness and ability to do so.  
 
Client-side perceptions of the need to invest in the HR management of agency workers 
 Consistent with the themes outlined in the literature review, our analysis highlighted two main 
influences on client organizations’ perceptions of the need for investments in the HR 
management of agency workers. The first concerned the level of risk associated with agency 
working, while the second related to the nature of contracts with TWAs and the degree of HR 
support they provided. 
  As we suggested earlier, client organizations will only invest in the HR management of 
agency workers if they perceive agency working as engendering significant risk. Respondents 
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across all six case study organizations highlighted such risks. This was especially regarding high 
(and rising) TWA fees and, of more concern here, the competency of agency workers. In terms 
of the latter, while many agency nurses and social workers were considered to be highly skilled, 
there were doubts about their lack of familiarity with local procedures, systems, politics and 
client groups (patients, families or children at risk, for example). For example, as SC(B)-1 
remarked: ‘… they wouldn’t necessarily know how SC(B) works …or our systems’. Others 
commented on the risks of relying on agency staff whose general training was ‘not up to the 
mark’ (SC(B)-7) or ‘not up to date’ (SC(B)-2). These problems were generally thought to 
increase the workloads of managers and co-workers: ‘it’s more work having an agency-trained 
nurse on the ward because you still have to be keeping an eye on them and supervising them’ 
(HT(C)-3).  
Concerns were also expressed about some agency workers’ lack of commitment both to 
the client organization and (in some instances) to their profession more generally. Although 
many were thought to have a strong sense of vocation, it was claimed that others did not ‘sign up 
to the ethos of the organization’ (HT(C)-1) or were only ‘committed to the pounds’ (HT(A)-7). 
As (SC(C)-7) commented: ‘I do feel they lack commitment, that it’s the money they’re after 
rather than commitment to the job’. Such problems were seen as potentially damaging not only to 
the quality of service received by client groups but also to staff morale within teams or wards, 
with permanent workers often being required to assume responsibility for more difficult jobs or 
caseloads. 
 Although in all six cases agency work was perceived as risky, this was variable, 
depending on the experience and training of individual agency workers and on the roles they 
performed. In the health cases, for example, it was stressed how they were greatest in ‘deep sub-
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specialties’, such as ITU, cardio, critical or intensive care or paediatric services (HT(B)-2), as 
opposed to wards where more basic cover was required. However, the overall perception was 
that agency working in core service roles was potentially hazardous, and, as a consequence, 
client-side managers needed to become more heavily involved in the HR management of the 
agency workforce.  
Another influence on client organizations’ perceptions of the need to invest in HR 
management was their relationship with the TWAs. Crucial here was the nature of contracts and 
the extent to which deeper ‘partnerships’ had been negotiated in which HR support for agency 
workers was included as part of the deal. Also important was the level of client confidence in the 
quality of HR support that TWAs were able to provide. 
Significant differences with regard to the TWA role were apparent between the health 
and social care sectors. In health, efforts had been made to develop more collaborative 
relationships with TWAs, with all three trusts having signed up to a framework agreement, 
negotiated at regional level (for Greater London). This committed a select group of preferred 
supplier TWAs to an agreed pricing structure and to ensuring agency staff met quality standards. 
Working within this framework, all three health trusts had negotiated deeper ‘partnership’ 
arrangements with one of the larger TWAs (TWA(A)) which acted as a sole supplier (or 
sometimes broker) of agency nurses. 
Although this contractual arrangement was primarily concerned with agency nurse supply 
and payroll administration, it had implications for other aspects of HRM. For example, with 
regard to training, the TWA was contractually obliged to ensure that all agency nurses had 
undertaken mandatory training in areas such as manual handling, infection control and fire 
regulations (TWA(A)-1). The TWA also offered a ‘professional development training bursary’, 
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which gave agency nurses a discounted rate to access more specialist clinical training to enhance 
their ‘portfolio of skills’ (TWA(A)-3). Some support was even provided for induction, with 
agency staff given briefings specific to the client organization (for example, on ‘crash 
instructions’). Lastly, all agency nurses were assigned a ‘consultant’ (mainly ‘ex-nurses with 
clinical experience’) responsible for annual performance reviews, including areas of professional 
development (TWA(A)-1). As such, there was some evidence that the TWA was taking a lead in 
developing HR interventions for the management of agency workers that were targeted to the 
client health trusts.  
By contrast, in social care, all three authorities had outsourced agency worker 
procurement to third-party vendor managed service (VMS) providers. Under these arrangements, 
the VMS provider did not provide staff itself but instead acted as an intermediary between the 
client organization and TWAs, inviting the latter to compete for vacancies via e-procurement 
systems. Through regular audits, these VMS contracts did generate some incentives for TWAs to 
increase their investments in the HR management of agency workers. As SC(B) one manager 
commented: ‘… they [VMS organizations] audit them [the supplier agencies] every six months, 
and obviously if it comes to light that an agency isn’t following procedures ... they would ask 
me, “should this agency be dropped from the list?”’ (SC(B)-1).  
At the same time, however, the VMS contracts appeared to make it harder for TWAs to 
develop HR solutions with client organizations. Specifically, they served to close off direct 
communication with the client, with communication having to be channelled through the VMS 
provider. As a manager at SC(C) explained, this had undermined valuable personal relationships 
with ‘trusted partners’ (SC(C)-8). It had also made it difficult for TWAs to develop the in-depth 
knowledge of client organizations necessary to play a performance management role or 
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contribute towards the development of agency workers’ organization specific skills. As SC(A)-3 
explained: ‘… they [the TWAs] are remote and I think that is always an issue …’. In addition, a 
further important element of the VMS providers’ role was to seek to reduce hourly rates as far as 
possible, which further limited the TWAs’ scope to make bespoke HR investments.  
 Hence, there were some notable differences between the health and social care cases in 
the extent to which TWAs were contributing to the HR management of agency workers. 
Partnership arrangements were more developed in health than social care (where the contractual 
set-up potentially had the reverse effect). However, even in the health cases, this greater 
formal/agreed provision of HRM was not always enough to allay client-side concerns. It was 
noted that actual levels of support from TWA(A) were highly variable and that training was 
largely focused on mandatory training rather than professional development. As one agency 
nurse (HT(A)-9) remarked: ‘they don’t really offer any training through TWA(A), or any sort of 
study days or anything like that. It’s just your yearly updates and fire safety things that you have 
to do...’ Line managers also commented on the difficulties TWAs faced regarding this. 
According to HT(C)-2, while agencies are able to buy in the ‘mandatory training … they won’t 
have people who are necessarily clinically competent enough to do things like tracheotomies or 
intravenous therapy…skills where you need to have a practical assessment’.  As such, even 
within the better-developed partnerships in the health cases, there was only limited ‘outsourcing’ 
of the responsibility for the HR management of agency workers to the TWAs.  
There was, therefore, little evidence to suggest that partnership arrangements with TWAs 
had developed to the point where client organizations no longer perceived a need to get involved 
in HR management themselves. This, however, leaves open the question of why, given that client 
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organizations acknowledged the risks associated with agency working, their own investments in 
HR management were so uneven. The next section addresses this issue. 
 
Factors constraining the development of targeted HRM in client organizations 
The research identified a number of factors constraining client organization willingness and 
ability to develop HR management policies and practices, even when they perceived a need to do 
so. These factors included: the duration of agency contracts; competing priorities within client 
organizations; and client managers’ interpretation of the regulatory context. 
Where the duration of agency contracts is concerned, there were significant differences 
between the health and social care cases. In social care, not only were agency workers used in 
greater numbers but they also represented the only means of covering for permanent staff 
vacancies. Hence, most contracts tended to be of a longer duration, fixed around ‘lines of work’, 
ranging from a few weeks to over a year in some cases. By contrast, in the health cases the 
existence of nurse ‘banks’ (using existing staff to cover vacancies) provided an alternative to 
TWAs. This meant that agency nurses were typically used to cover individual shifts on shorter 
duration contracts (of days or weeks). According to a ward manager at HT(B), agency nurses 
tended to be ‘one-off people you don’t ever meet again’ (HT(B)-6), while another suggested: ‘it 
doesn’t mean anything to you because you think “oh I’ve never heard of their name”. They 
come, they do their shift and they’re gone. And occasionally you might see somebody returning 
but often it’s almost like a one-off event’ (HT(A)-8). 
This was significant in shaping the investments client organizations were prepared to 
make in the health cases. As a nurse manager (HT(C)-4) explained: ‘…it’s always been that the 
temporary staff have been at the bottom of the pile because the investment is in the people who 
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are going to give something back longer-term ...’. Even spending extra time on induction and 
supervision was viewed by some client organization managers as a ‘luxury’ given the short-term 
nature of assignments and the fact that the same agency nurses were rarely seen more than twice 
on the same ward. As such, although the perceptions of risk associated with agency worker use 
were as great in health as in social care, there was some reluctance on the part of client managers 
in the health cases to over-engage in their HR management given the typically short duration of 
agency contracts and perceived low returns on this investment.  
Closely related to the above, an additional factor influencing client organizations’ 
willingness to invest in the HR management of agency workers related to competing 
organizational priorities to cut the costs associated with their use. Important here were initiatives 
aimed at reducing overall reliance on agency staff. As mentioned above, efforts had been made 
by the health trusts to develop their own ‘banks’ and to substitute agency workers as far as 
possible with internal bank employees. All three trusts had adopted strongly-enforced ‘bank first’ 
policies, based on the assumption that bank staff were both cheaper and more reliable than 
agency workers. As a nurse manager at HT(A) explained, not only are bank staff ‘financially 
sensible’, but ‘technically they know more or less all the policies for the Trust...so you stick to 
what you know’ (HT(A)-6).  This was the case even where highly specialist nurses were required 
(in ITU for example) (HT(B)-5). 
In the social care cases, while recognising the difficulties involved in permanent staff 
recruitment, senior managers also viewed reducing the reliance on agency workers and 
controlling the costs associated with agency worker use as a long-term goal. As the SC(C) HR 
manager put it: ‘... we’ve been strategically inclined to decrease our reliance on agency workers’ 
(SC(C)-3).  All three local authorities were seeking to reduce agency use by: improved 
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recruitment and retention of permanent staff via targeted recruitment campaigns both in the UK 
and overseas; improved career ladders for permanent staff; the implementation of flexible 
working arrangements; formal ‘temp-to-perm’ policies; better sickness absence management; 
better caseload management; and improved succession planning. At SC(A), an ‘attraction 
package’ had been developed ‘to emphasize what it is that you will get if you’re a permanent 
worker that you wouldn’t get if you were an agency worker …’ (SC(A)-1). These initiatives had 
significant implications for the development of dedicated HR practices for agency workers. In a 
context where effort and resources were being expended on policies aimed at reducing agency 
worker use, it had become difficult to justify investing in the management of a workforce that the 
organization would have ideally liked to have seen reduced in size, or even completely 
eradicated.  
The imperative to control the costs associated with agency worker use had also helped 
encourage the view within client organizations that the HR management of agency workers 
should be ‘outsourced’ wherever possible to TWAs (despite the limitations in TWAs’ ability to 
deliver with regard to this). At HT(A), several respondents argued that agency worker training 
and support were essentially ‘down to the agency to sort out’ (HT(A)-1) or ‘the employer’s job – 
the agency’ (HT(A)-7). Similarly, in social care, SC(B)-1 commented: ‘...it is very clearly the 
recruitment agency’s responsibility to provide statutory training …’. In the health cases, this 
view was given added weight by the contractual relationships negotiated with TWAs (as 
described above). As an HR manager at HT(B) explained: ‘If you’re an agency on the PASA 
framework then you’re expected to make sure that all your individuals have got all the 
mandatory training and they’ve got Criminal Record Bureau checks and they’ve got references… 
that’s up to the agency’ (HT(B)-3). As such, while client-side managers were generally cynical 
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about the ability of TWAs to deliver effective HR management support for agency workers (see 
above), many also took the view that the primary responsibility for making these investments 
still sat (legally and contractually) with the TWA. 
A further factor constraining client organization willingness to invest in the HR 
management of agency workers related to the regulatory context. In the UK legal context in 
which the research was conducted, this was inimical to greater client organization involvement 
for two reasons. First, adding to the view within client organizations that the management of 
agency workers should be outsourced to the TWA, the main thrust of the relevant employment 
legislation was to define the TWA as the legally-defined ‘employer’ of agency staff and therefore 
responsible for the HR management of the agency workforce. As the assistant director of nursing 
at HT(C) explained: ‘The agency, in essence, is their employer, not me’ (HT(C) – 3). In social 
care, a VMS Business Development Manager (TWA(B)-2)) commented: ‘... their employment 
relationship is basically with the agency they work for’.  
Second, while the law generally defined the TWA as the employer, it only did so in 
instances where there was a clear distinction in the client organization’s treatment of agency and 
directly-employed staff. This led to concerns within client organizations that, should they invest 
too heavily in the HR management of agency workers (thereby treating them similarly to 
directly-employed staff), this would result in them being viewed as the legally-defined employer 
(thereby conferring de facto employment rights on the agency worker). While some managers 
did not see this as a problem as they were seeking to encourage agency workers to take 
permanent contracts anyway, the concern remained that employment rights might be conferred 
on agency workers whose commitment or competency was seen as questionable. These 
regulatory concerns were a particular issue in social care where contracts were generally of 
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longer duration and hence there was a much greater chance of agency workers being viewed as 
de facto employees. For example, at SC(C), one Project Manager (SC(C)-9) suggested that: ‘if 
you give a disciplinary to an agency worker, it’s a sure no-no because it could be seen to be … 
treating them as an employee’.  Similarly (SC(A)-2) commented: ‘… you have to be very careful 
with interim workers not to give them supervision and not to review their performance because 
you don’t want to be seen to be treating them like an employee …’. At SC(B), care was taken to 
restrict agency workers from participating in team or even social events. As a senior manager 
explained: ‘... for any team events, the agency staff will not necessarily attend and they will hold 
the fort back in the office’ (SC(B)-3).   
Therefore, while client organization investments in the HR management of agency 
workers were greater than one might anticipate (as identified above), their understanding of the 
regulatory context acted as a brake on this process, encouraging client managers to view such 
investments as the devolved responsibility of TWAs. However, as discussed earlier, the ability of 
the latter to meet these demands was restricted (particularly in social care). This was due to both 
the practical difficulties associated with managing and developing social workers and nurses 
once in role, and the client organizations’ focus on ensuring value for money, which reduced 
TWA margins and hence their ability to make bespoke investments. These dynamics resulted in a 
perverse situation where both TWAs and client organizations recognized the need for greater 
investments in the HR management of agency workers (given the risks noted earlier) but neither 
party was willing (or possibly able) to take primary responsibility for making these investments. 
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Discussion and conclusions 
Drawing upon the cases of agency working in the health and social care sectors, this paper set 
out to explore two questions: how and in what ways do client organizations invest in the HR 
management of agency workers in core organizational roles; and what are the factors that shape 
or influence these investments? While the literature suggests that client organizations may 
perceive a need to become more involved in this area (Fischer et al., 2008; Zimmerman et al. 
2013), to date, little research has been conducted.  
Our analysis has sought to address this limitation by demonstrating empirically the role 
client organizations play in the ongoing HR management of agency workers. In both the health 
and social care sectors, in response to the risks associated with agency working, HR practices 
had been developed in the areas of induction, training, performance management and 
communication. Of course, it is important to keep in mind the significant variation both within 
and between the two sectors in terms of the extent of implementation of these practices. In many 
ways these HR interventions fell short of the strategic approach to the management of flexible 
labor envisaged by some observers (Koene et al., 2014), and tended to be developed by line 
managers rather than led by the HR function. Nevertheless, their very existence highlights a 
more active form of client involvement in the management of agency workers than has 
previously been documented in the literature.  
Our analysis also advances understanding of the conditions that shape or influence the 
adoption of these HR practices. Here, our findings can be brought together in a process model, 
presented diagrammatically in Figure 1. The model contains three main elements: the factors 
shaping client organizations’ perceptions of the need to invest in HR practices for agency 
workers; the factors shaping or influencing client organizations’ willingness or ability to invest 
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in HR practices for agency workers; and the inter-relationships between these first two sets of 
factors. As outlined below, the model allows us to make a number of propositions regarding the 
use and management of agency workers.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Regarding the model’s first element (factors shaping client organizations’ perceptions of 
the need to invest in HR practices for agency workers), our analysis suggests that a prima facie 
case for client organization involvement in the HR management of agency workers (box c) will 
be influenced by two factors: the category of agency worker (box a); and the role played by 
TWAs (box b). Concerning the first of these, as noted earlier, a heavy reliance on agency 
working is far from risk-free for employers (Cappelli & Keller, 2013). Concerns are frequently 
expressed in relation to agency workers’ lack of organization-specific knowledge (Vitranen et 
al., 2003), while the often transactional nature of psychological contracts with client 
organizations may limit their willingness to engage in ‘pro-role’ behavior (Galais & Moser, 
2009). These risks, in turn, are likely to increase client organizations’ perceptions of the need to 
make targeted investments in the HR management of agency workers (Koene & van Riemsdijk, 
2005).  
However, these risks may be especially pronounced where agency workers are used in 
core organizational roles, and where HR theorising (Lepak and Snell, 1999) normally predicts 
the use of permanent employment or insourcing. This was apparent in both the social care and 
health cases. We saw, for example, how agency worker use was primarily a response to supply-
side factors such as skill shortages and a growing number of professionals opting for agency 
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work to obtain higher financial rewards and flexible (portfolio) careers. We also noted that this 
contributed to heightened perceptions of risk amongst client-side managers, especially regarding 
agency workers’ commitment and organization-specific knowledge.  Hence, the model’s first 
proposition is: client organizations’ perceptions of the need to invest in the HR management of 
agency workers will be greater where agency workers are used to fill core organizational roles 
normally subject to a permanent employment contract. 
 The second key factor shaping client organizations’ perceptions of the need to invest in 
the HR management of agency workers concerns the nature and effectiveness of the support 
offered by TWAs (box b). The possibility that TWAs might contribute to the HR management of 
agency workers via ‘partnerships’ with client organizations is frequently noted in the literature 
(Bidwell & Fernandez-Mateo, 2010; Nesheim et al., 2007), the implication being that when both 
parties view agency worker development as a shared responsibility, this can improve both job 
quality and performance (Knox, 2014; Mitlacher 2008). By contrast, where TWA-client 
organization relationships are more transactional in nature and focused on cost minimization 
(Author B et al., 2008), TWAs may offer less support, which in turn could increase the pressure 
on client organizations to invest in managing agency workers. Our own evidence provides 
support for these arguments. While relationships generally fell short of the deep ‘partnerships’ 
between client organizations and TWAs reported elsewhere in the literature (see, for example: 
Smith and Neuwith, 2009; Hakansson and Isidorsson, 2012), there was evidence to suggest that 
the hospital trusts did receive more support from TWAs (notably in basic training and induction) 
than was the case in social care. In the health cases, boundaries between the TWA and client 
organizations had arguably become more ‘permeable’ (Bonet et al., 2013), enabling the TWA to 
fulfil some ‘employer’ responsibilities beyond limited ‘payroll’ functions on behalf of the client. 
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By contrast, in social care, a far more transactional relationship was apparent, partly due to the 
reliance on vendor managed service providers with a strong focus on cost reduction (see also: 
Author B et al., 2011). As such, the model’s second proposition is: client organizations’ 
perceptions of the need to invest in the HR management of agency workers will be greater where 
relationships between TWAs and client organizations are transactional in nature and where 
TWAs are unwilling or unable to provide focused support.  
 Turning to the model’s second element (the factors that shape or influence client 
organizations’ willingness and ability to invest in HR practices for agency workers), a key issue 
is whether client organizations are able to make sustained investments even when they perceive a 
need for them. As Figure 1 demonstrates, three factors might be particularly important here. The 
first concerns the likely costs and benefits associated with investment in HR practices and how 
these are influenced by the duration of contracts (box d). In our study, the longer tenure of 
agency workers in social care contributed to a greater willingness on the part of client 
organizations to invest in their training and development. By contrast, in healthcare, the case for 
‘long-horizon investments’ (Krausert, 2014: 69) was far less compelling. Hence, the model’s 
third proposition is: the likelihood that client organizations will invest in the HR management of 
agency workers will be influenced by contract tenure and calculations concerning likely return 
on investment. 
The second factor relates to competing demands (Ward et al., 2001) (box e). Important 
here are tensions between the need to ensure agency worker commitment and contribution to 
performance (Koene et al., 2014) and pressures to minimise costs (Knox, 2014). In our own 
cases, these tensions were especially strong partly because the use of agency working in core 
roles was largely unplanned (and unwanted). As a consequence, efforts were being made to find 
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alternatives, including the use of in-house staff banks or improved recruitment and retention 
policies for permanent staff (see also: Author A et al., 2011). The model’s fourth proposition, 
therefore, is that: client-side investments in the HR management of agency workers will be lower 
where there are competing organizational demands for cost-minimization.  
 The third factor concerns the regulatory environment, in particular whether the TWA or 
the client organization are defined as the primary ‘employer’ (Davidov, 2004) (box f). In our 
case studies, the dominant view was that TWAs were the legal employer. However, this was 
sufficiently ambiguous for client managers to fear that their own attempts to develop HR 
management practices would lead to agency workers being deemed de facto employees. This 
understanding of the regulatory environment also bolstered the view that the management of 
agency workers should be mainly (if not exclusively) outsourced to TWAs. As such, the model’s 
fifth proposition is that: the likelihood that client organizations will invest in HR practices aimed 
at agency workers will be lower where the regulatory environment is seen as defining the TWA 
as the ‘employer’. 
 The final element of Figure 1 relates to the inter-relationships (indicated by lines i and ii) 
between competing demands for cost minimization (box e) and perceptions of the regulatory 
environment (box f)), and the role played by TWAs (box b). Perceptions of the regulatory 
environment (box f) may exaggerate client-side tendencies to delegate or outsource ‘employer’ 
responsibilities to TWAs (line i). It is also possible, however, that client organizations’ cost 
minimization priorities (box e) will lead to the negotiation of contractual relationships with 
TWAs that seek to reduce costs and displace risk (Grimshaw et al., 2004) (line ii). In this 
context, it becomes harder for TWAs to offer additional HR support or for client organizations to 
develop closer partnerships with TWAs that encourage ‘longer term relational investments’ 
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(Purcell et al., 2005), as they have less financial leeway to do so. This leads to the model’s final 
proposition: client organizations’ expectations that TWAs will provide HR support will be 
greater where the regulatory environment defines the TWA as the employer, but the ability of 
TWAs to provide such support will be reduced by client organizations’ competing cost-
minimization priorities. 
Our contention is that the model depicted in Figure 1 applies to all situations where a 
triangular employment relationship exists involving agency workers, TWAs and client 
organizations. In any context, it is useful to differentiate between pressures that increase the need 
(or demand) for client involvement in the HR management of agency workers and the factors 
that are likely to shape or influence how they respond to this need. There are, however, several 
boundary conditions beyond which the model’s predictive value may weaken. As the first 
proposition above suggests, the model has greatest relevance when agency workers are used to 
fill core roles. A further boundary condition relates to the regulatory context and how far this 
assigns either the TWA or client organization as primary employer (as discussed above). In 
certain European countries (for instance Sweden and the Netherlands) employer responsibilities 
lie more unambiguously with the TWA (Voss et al., 2013). This could increase the likelihood 
that TWAs will offer targeted support for agency workers, and in the process also reduce the 
need for client organization investments in HR practices (see, for example: Hakansson & 
Isidorsson (2012) and Koene & van Riemsdijk (2005)).  
Notwithstanding these boundary conditions, our study has broader implications for theory 
and practice. Concerning theory, we advance understanding of the triangular relationship 
between TWAs, agency workers and client organizations (Davidov, 2004). In much of the 
literature, client organizations are assumed to be largely passive or reactive actors in the HR 
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management of agency workers (Bonet et al., 2013; Nesheim et al., 2007). By contrast, others 
have suggested that greater client-side involvement in this area may be possible (and useful) 
given the risks and hidden costs associated with agency working (Mitlacher, 2008; Fischer et al. 
2008). In this paper, we find support for this latter perspective, noting the enlarged and more 
active role that client organizations can sometimes play. This challenges the standard depiction 
of the triangular relationship in which client organizations’ management practices are often 
obscured from view. However, our analysis also reveals that client involvement in the 
management of agency working is far from problem-free and that the nature and extent of such 
involvement is likely to be highly variable (as depicted in Figure 1).  
Second, our analysis contributes to a broader understanding of Lepak and Snell’s (1999) 
HR architecture model. While Lepak and Snell (1999: 42) are right to caution against a ‘one size 
fits all’ approach, noting the need for HR systems to vary for different forms of human capital, 
they nevertheless assume that managers have the freedom to choose the employment modes, 
employment relationships and HR configurations they adopt for each workforce segment, and 
ensure these are consistent with each other. However, this did not happen in either of our cases. 
Instead, we found that due to supply side pressures, managers were forced into an ‘acquisition’ 
employment mode where an ‘internal development’ mode might have been deemed preferable. 
In such instances, rather than a ‘market based’ HR configuration as typically used in conjunction 
with ‘acquisition’ employment modes, our research suggested the need for an HR configuration 
closer to the commitment-based model normally associated with permanent employment. 
Therefore, our analysis draws attention to the existence of hybrid situations, in which the 
‘employment modes’ and ‘HR configurations’ used within the same quadrant of Lepak and 
Snell’s (1999) model are not necessarily congruent with each other. As we noted earlier, it also 
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highlights the problematic nature of such hybrid situations, given the dilemmas organizations are 
likely to face in applying HR configurations to employee groups (such as highly skilled agency 
workers) whom they are not normally applied. 
In addition, our results have implications for practice. As noted above, agency working 
(like other forms of non-standard employment) is often not a high priority for client managers or 
HR practitioners. While it may be acknowledged as a challenge, it frequently falls outside the 
‘traditional inside view of the HR department’ (Mitlacher, 2008: 455). It has been argued that the 
HR function should adopt a more strategic and inclusive approach towards managing the agency 
workforce (Koene et al., 2014). In demonstrating the importance of agency worker performance 
to patient care outcomes in the health trusts and safeguarding outcomes in social care, our study 
supports this view. However, it also highlights the very significant dilemmas and obstacles HR 
managers are likely to face in becoming more strategically involved in managing agency 
workers, notably in terms of navigating competing priorities and responding to the (perceived) 
demands of external regulation. As such, while the HR function arguably needs to become more 
involved, this may require both a different (more inclusive) mind-set and enhanced capabilities 
associated with managing change.  
When drawing these conclusions it is important to note certain caveats and directions for 
future research. In particular, more work is needed to explore whether the model outlined in 
Figure 1 holds across a broader range of industry sectors (especially the private sector), 
geographical locations and institutional contexts. As discussed earlier, different regulatory 
conditions may have a decisive influence on the practices of TWAs and client organizations’ 
perceptions of the need to respond to the challenges posed by agency workers. Attention might 
also focus on the effectiveness of client-side HR practices in ‘on-boarding’ agency workers 
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(Fischer et al., 2008) and creating positive inducements. Indeed, while our analysis highlights the 
factors that might influence the adoption of such practices, more work is needed to better 
understand their impact. Future research of this nature will help to increase understanding of the 
strategies organizations need to adopt when responding to the challenges presented by agency 
working, how these strategies emerge and the conditions that influence their effectiveness.    
 
References 
  
Appelbaum, E., Bailey, T., Berg, P., & Kalleberg, A. L. (2000). Manufacturing Advantage: Why 
High-Performance Work Systems Pay Off. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.  
Author A. et al. (2011) 
Author B and Author A (2008). 
Author B et al. (2011).   
Author B et al. (2008) 
Barley, S. R. and Kunda, G. (2004) Gurus, Hired Guns, and Warm Bodies Itinerant Experts in a 
Knowledge Economy. Princeton. Princeton University Press.  
Bidwell, M. (2009). Do peripheral workers do peripheral work? Comparing the use of highly 
skilled contractors and regular employees’. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 62: 200225.  
  
Bidwell, M., & Fernandez-Mateo, I. (2010). Relationship duration and returns to brokerage in the 
staffing sector, Organization Science, 21, 1141–1158.  
  
Bonet, R., Cappelli, P. & Hamori, M. (2013). Labor market intermediaries and the new paradigm 
for human resources, Academy of Management Annals, 7, 341-392.  
 
Broschak, J. P., & Davis-Blake, A. (2006). Mixing standard work and nonstandard deals: The 
consequences of heterogeneity in employment arrangements. Academy of Management 
Journal, 49, 2, 371-393. 
 
Cappelli, P.H. & Keller, J.R. (2013). A study of the extent and potential causes of alternative 
employment arrangements, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 66, 874-890.  
  
Page 35 of 49
John Wiley & Sons
Human Resource Management
FOR REVIEW
 
 
36 
 
Carey, M. (2011). Here today, gone tomorrow? The ambivalent ethics of contingency social 
work, Critical Social Policy, 31, 4, 540-561.  
 
Cornes, M., Manthorpe, J., Moriarty, J., Blendi-Mahota, S. & Hussein, S. (2013). Assessing the 
effectiveness of policy interventions to reduce the use of agency or temporary social workers in 
England, Health and Social Care in the Community, 21, 236-244.  
 
Coyle-Shapiro, J.A-M., Morrow, P.C., and Kessler, I. (2006). Serving Two Organizations: 
Exploring the Employment Relationship of Contracted Employees, Human Resource 
Management, 45, 561–583. 
 
Davidov, G. (2004). Joint employer status in triangular employment relationships, British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 42, 727–746.  
  
Davis-Blake, A. & Broschak, J.P. (2000). Speed bumps or stepping stones: The effects of labor 
market intermediaries on relational wealth. In C.R. Leana and D.M. Rousseau (eds.), Relational 
Wealth: The Advantages of Stability in a Changing Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
91-115.  
  
De Ruyter, A., Kirkpatrick, I., Hoque, K., Lonsdale, C. & Malan, J. (2008). Agency working and 
the degradation of public service employment: The case of nurses and social workers, 
International Journal of Human Resource Management, 19, 432-445.   
  
Feldman, D.C., Doerpinghaus, H.I. & Turnley, W.H. (1994). Managing temporary workers: A 
permanent HRM challenge, Organizational Dynamics, 23, 49–63.  
  
Fischer, S.L., Wasserman, M.E., Wolf, P.P. & Wears, K.H. (2008). Human resource issues in 
outsourcing: Integrating research and practice, Human Resource Management, 47, 501-523.  
  
Galais, N. & Moser, K. (2009). Organizational commitment and the well-being of temporary 
agency workers: A longitudinal study, Human Relations, 62, 589-620.  
  
Gioia, D., Corley, K., & Hamilton, A. (2011). Seeking Qualitative Rigor in Inductive Research: 
Notes on the Gioia Methodology. 16(1): 15-31.  
 
Grimshaw D. Willmott, H. & Rubery, J. (2004). Inter-organizational networks: trust, power and 
the employment relationship. In Marchington, M. Grimshaw, D., Rubery, J. and Willmott, H. 
(eds.) Fragmenting Work: Blurring Organizational Boundaries and Disordering Hierarchies. 
Oxford.  
  
Hakansson, K. & Isidorsson, T. (2012). Work organizational outcomes of the use of temporary 
agency workers. Organization Studies, 33, 487-505.  
  
Page 36 of 49
John Wiley & Sons
Human Resource Management
FOR REVIEW
 
 
37 
 
Houseman, S.N., Kallenberg, A.L. & Erickcer, G.A. (2003). The role of temporary agency 
employment in tight labor markets, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 57, 1, 105-127. 
 
Hurst, K. & Smith, A. (2011). Temporary nursing staff: Cost and quality issues, Journal of 
Advanced Nursing, 67, 287-296.  
  
Knox, A. (2014). Human resource management (HRM) in temporary work agencies: Evidence 
from the hospitality industry, The Economic and Labor Relations Review. 25, 1, 81–98 
 
Koene, B.A.S. & van Riemsdijk, M. (2005). Managing temporary workers: Work identity, 
diversity, operational HR choices, Human Resource Management Journal, 15, 76-92.  
 
Koene, B., Garsten, C., & Galais, N. (2014). Management and Organization of Temporary Work. 
In B. Koene, N. Galais, & C. Garsten (Eds.), Management and Organization of Temporary 
Agency Work (pp. 1-20). New York: Routledge. Routledge Studies in Management, 
Organizations and Society 
  
Krausert, A. (2014). HRM systems for knowledge workers: differences among top managers, 
middle managers, and professional employees. Human Resource Management, 53, 1, 67-87. 
 
Lafond, S., Arora, S., Charlesworth, A. & McKeon, A. (2014). Into the Red: The State of NHS 
Finances. London: Nuffield Trust.  
  
Lepak, D.P. & Snell, S.A. (1999). The human resource architecture: Towards a theory of human 
capital allocation and development, Academy of Management Review, 24, 31-48.  
  
Liden, R.C., Wayne, S.J., Kraimer, M.L. & Sparrowe, R.T. (2003). The dual commitments of 
contingent workers: An examination of contingents’ commitments to an agency and the 
organization. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 24, 609-625.  
  
Manthorpe, J., Cornes, M. & Moriarty, J. (2012). Considering the safeguarding risks presented 
by agency or temporary social care staff: Research findings and recommendations, The Journal 
of Adult Protection, 14, 122-130.  
 
Matusik, S.F. & Hill, C. W. L. (1998). The utilization of contingent work, knowledge creation, 
and competitive advantage, Academy of Management Review, 23, 4, 680-697. 
 
Meyer, S. & B. Lunnay (2013). The application of abductive and retroductive inference for the 
design and analysis of theory driven sociological research, Sociological Research Online, 18. 
 
Mitlacher, L.M. (2008). Job quality and temporary agency work: Challenges for human resource 
management in triangular employment relations in Germany, International Journal of Human 
Resource Management, 19:3, 446-460 
Page 37 of 49
John Wiley & Sons
Human Resource Management
FOR REVIEW
 
 
38 
 
 
Nesheim, T., Olsen, K.M., & Kalleberg, A.L. (2007). Externalising the core firms’ use of 
employment intermediaries in the information and communications technology industry, Human 
Resource Management, 46, 247-264.  
  
Osnowitz, D. (2010). Freelancing expertise: contract professionals in the new economy. Ithaca: 
NY: ILR Press. 
 
Patton, M. (1990). Qualitative Evaluation & Research Methods Beverly Hills: Sage. 
Pearce, J.L. (1993). Towards an organizational behavior of contract laborers: Their psychological 
involvement and effects on employee co-workers, Academy of Management Journal, 36, 1082–
1096.  
  
Peel, S. & Boxall, P. (2005). When is contracting preferable to employment? An exploration of 
management and worker perspectives, Journal of Management Studies, 42, 1676-1697.  
  
Purcell, J., Purcell, K. & Tailby, S. (2005). Temporary work agencies: Here today, gone 
tomorrow?, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 42, 705-725.  
  
Schraer, R. (2014). Spending on agency social workers has increased by a third, Community 
Care, November 14 (www.communitycare.co.uk: accessed 18/3/16).  
  
Schlossler, F., Templer, A. & Ghanam, D. (2006). How human resource outsourcing affects 
organizational learning in the knowledge economy, Journal of Labor Research, 27, 291-303.  
  
Smith, V. & Neuwirth, E.B. (2009). Temporary help agencies and the making of a new 
employment practice, Academy of Management Perspectives, 23, 56–72.  
  
Stanworth, C. & Druker, J. (2006). Human resource solutions? Dimensions of employer’s use of 
agency labour in the UK, Personnel Review, 25, 175-190.  
  
Storey, J., Quintas, P., Taylor, P & Fowle, W. (2002). Flexible employment contracts and their 
implications for product and process innovation, International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 13, 1, 1–18. 
Torka, N. (2011). Agency workers and organization's commitment, International Journal of 
Human Resource Management, 22, 7, 1570-1585. 
 
Torka, N. & Schyns, B. (2010). On the job and co-worker commitment of Dutch agency workers 
and permanent employees, International Journal of Human Resource Management, 21:8, 1307-
1322 
 
Page 38 of 49
John Wiley & Sons
Human Resource Management
FOR REVIEW
 
 
39 
 
Vitranen, M., Kivimaki, M., Vitranen, P., Elovainio, M. & Vahetra, J. (2003). Disparity in 
occupational training and career planning between contingent and permanent employees, 
European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 12, 19-36.  
  
Voss, E., Vitols, K., Favaque, N., Broughton, A., Behling, F., Dota, F., Leoardi, S. & 
Naedenoen, F. (2013). The Role of Temporary Agency Work and Labour Market Transitions in 
Europe. Hamburg, Germany: Eurociett/UNI/ Europa.  
 
Ward, K., D. Grimshaw, J. Rubery, and H. Beynon (2001). Dilemmas in the management of 
temporary work agency staff. Human Resource Management Journal, 11, 4, 3-21. 
Zimmerman, T. Gavrilova-Aguilar, M. and Cullum, P. (2013). Rethinking Human Resource 
Strategies: A Shift in the Treatment of Contingent Workers, International Journal of Business 
and Management; Vol. 8, No. 7; 28-34. 
  
 
 
Page 39 of 49
John Wiley & Sons
Human Resource Management
FOR REVIEW
Table 1: Background information on the cases  
  
  HT(A)  HT(B)  HT(C)  SC(A)  SC(B)  SC(C)  
Total employment 
(of Trust or Local 
authority)  
9000  2500  6000  7987  8600  10500  
Annual gross 
expenditure 2007/8 
(millions)  
£676  £260  £402  £528  £999  £983  
Total employment 
of nurses (including 
midwifery) or social 
workers (adult and 
education services)  
3150  900  1928  195  258  345  
Number of (FTE) 
posts filled by 
agency nurses or 
social workers in 
given month, 2008    
109   
(Jan)  
29   
(Feb)  
60  
(Estimate of  
average in all  
months)  
47  
(June)  
101  
(Feb)  
207 (Jan)  
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Table 2a: HR practices: social care 
 Key practices Illustrative examples 
Ability Extended induction 
programmes, including 
‘induction packs’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agency worker inclusion in 
job-specific training. 
SC(A): “… In terms of induction they’d have all the statutory things … and we’d send them on a little introduction to 
SC(A) that the Council runs.  We’d take them through the policies and procedures for the department, we’d get them 
to shadow and sit with people to see how the SC(A) procedures operate …” (SC(A)-6).  
  
SC(B): “… we introduce them to the service … so they have additional support and they understand what is the aim of 
the service, what is the goal, what are we trying to achieve …” (SC(B)-6) 
 
SC(C): “It’s induction into how the teams work, introduction to other agencies, looking at the resources that we use. 
Just generally about the service … it’s introduction to colleagues, introduction to other departments, to other teams, 
shadowing social workers.” (SC(C)-7) 
 
SC(A): “... we wouldn’t exclude them ... if other people are receiving awareness training ... say something like 
safeguarding ... they would attend like anyone else.” (SC(A)-2) 
 
SC(B): “We offer them training to the extent that they need training in SC(B)’s policies and procedures … if there are 
locally specific training requirements … they will get training.” (SC(B)-1)  
 
SC(C): “we want them to be skilled for the families they’re working with …” (SC(C)-5) 
Motivation Monthly supervision 
meetings focusing on 
agency worker performance 
management. 
 
SC(A): “… they’ll have a monthly assessment through supervision and I’ll have daily reviews of their cases.” (SC(A)-
3) 
 
SC(B): “… we set targets and review targets.” (SC(B)-3) 
 
SC(C): “I have a work plan ... to make sure ... they [agency staff] are progressing and are working according to the 
job description.” (SC(C)-7) 
Opportunity  Integration of agency 
workers into teams 
SC(A): agency workers are: “included in team stuff and … departmental things … they’re pretty much treated like the 
permanent staff” (SC(A)-7).  
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SC(B): “… we do want to make the agency worker feel part of their team … They’d be part of team meetings.” 
(SC(B)-7) 
 
SC(C): “I would expect them to function like any other team member.”  
(SC(C)-6) 
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Table 2b: HR practices: health cases 
 Key practices Examples 
 Ability Practices mandating 
induction checklists at 
entry stage. 
 
 
 
 
 
Limited (‘extended 
induction’) training made 
available to some agency 
staff and TWAs in 
specialist areas. 
HT(A):  “…each member of temporary staff allocated to work in a ward they have to fill in a form which says they’ve 
been shown where the fire escapes are and where all the stuff is that they need to know, what the crash number is, fire 
number” (HT(A)-1) 
 
HT(B): “But agency nurses should get orientated to the ward, they just get told where to come, they get shown … 
basically there’s supposed to be a checklist that people are meant to fill in which we have to do for the Healthcare 
Commission”  (HT(B)-1) 
 
HT(C): “We’ve got a checklist that we tick off when they arrive on the ward, an induction checklist…” (HT(C)-5) 
 
HT(A): “…there are some occasions where for IVs … we have provided that for specialist areas because the Trust 
have a procedure with regards to giving IVs” (HT(A)-5). 
 
HT(B): “I have within the team here a tracheotomy nurse specialist; she runs tracheotomy study days, which the bank 
and agency nurses can attend”. (HT(B)-6). 
 
HT(C): “They [agency workers] can certainly access our courses and pay for them if they’re payable ones…for 
example, I do safeguarding children and I have agency nurses that elect to come and do that, but they’ll probably do it 
in their own time”. (HT(C)-1). 
Motivation No formal appraisal, but 
agency workers closely 
supervised and 
‘performance’ and 
development managed 
through formal processes 
(involving TWAs). 
HT(A): “In cases of sub-standard agency worker performance: “we would expect people [line managers] to talk to 
that individual, understand why that happened, and then report back to the agency.  It’s not just a case of, you know, 
washing their hands of them…So we do ask managers to take responsibility” (HT(A)-3). 
 
HT(B):  “There is a… performance management process you’d go through to say this nurse is unsuitable. And it may 
be they’re unsuitable for your area, i.e. specialty-wise, and they’ve just been sent to the wrong place, or actually they 
may be unsuitable to work in the Trust” (HT(B)-7). 
 
HT(C): “if we had concerns of an agency or bank nurse that weren’t up to the standard expected…then we report 
them…to the agency involved involved…then they’ll take appropriate action themselves” (HT(C)-3). 
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Opportunity  Agency worker 
involvement addressed 
indirectly through 
attempts to encourage 
integration in teams and 
practices such as feedback 
forms.  
HT(A): “If we get dissatisfaction forms from the [Agency] nurses we’ve had, I certainly take that and say, you know, to 
the team of nurses ‘now come on, think again’” (HT(A)-2). 
 
HT(B): “Only by improving treatment will one also improve the performance of agency staff…So it’s trying to get 
people [line managers] to understand that the more they put into it the more they get out of it” (HT(B)-2). 
 
HT(C): “They’re (agency staff) here to help us you know…they’re like my new best friend for the shift because they’ve 
come to actually help us.  So I would be very angry if I felt that people were not making people welcome” (HT(C)-7). 
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Appendix 1: Profile of Hospital Trust Respondent 
 
Identifier Role Gender 
HOSPITAL TRUST A   
HT(A)-1 Acting Deputy Chief Nurse F 
HT(A)-2 Head of Nursing (Cardio Thoracic Services) F 
HT(A)-3 Head of Corporate HR F 
HT(A)-4 Procurement manager M 
HT(A)-5 Acting Resourcing Manager for Temporary Staffing Services M 
HT(A)-6 Head of Nursing for Renal Neurology F 
HT(A)-7 Ward Sister  F 
HT(A)-8 Ward Sister  F 
HT(A)-9 Agency Nurse, TWA(A) F 
TWA(A)-1 Operations Manager, TWA(A) (overseeing HT(A)) M 
HOSPITAL TRUST B   
HT(B)-1 Assistant Director of Nursing – Workforce F 
HT(B)-2 Director of Nursing Education and Workforce Development F 
HT(B)-3 Assistant Director of HR M 
HT(B)-4 Nursing Bank Manager  F 
HT(B)-5 Ward Sister  F 
HT(B)-6 Ward Sister  F 
HT(B)-7 Lead Nurse F 
HT(B)-8 Agency Nurse, TWA(A) F 
TWA(A)-2 Operations manager, TWA(A) (overseeing HT (B)) M 
HOSPITAL TRUST C   
HT(C)-1 Assistant Director of Nursing (Bank) F 
HT(C)-2 Staff Bank Senior Nurse/Manager F 
HT(C)-3 Assistant Director Nursing (General) F 
HT(C)-4 Head of Nursing – Adult Intensive Care F 
HT(C)-5 Ward Sister F 
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HT(C)-6 Ward Sister F 
HT(C)-7 Ward Sister F 
HT(C)-8 Ward Sister F 
HT(C)-9 Agency nurse, TWA(A) F 
TWA(A)-3/ TWA(A)-4 Business and Contracts Manager; and General Manager TWA(A) (overseeing HT(C)) F, M 
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Appendix 2: Profile of Social Care Respondents 
 
Identifier Role Gender 
SOCIAL CARE A 
 
  
   
SC(A)-1 Assistant Director of Children’s Services F 
SC(A)-2 Divisional Director for Quality and Performance F 
SC(A)-3 Commissioning Manager M 
SC(A)-4 Recruitment Manager F 
SC(A)-5 Residential Services Manager M 
SC(A)-6 Acting Assistant Assessment Manager (Children’s social 
Services) 
M 
SC(A)-7 Group Manager (area based childcare team) M 
SC(A)-8 Agency worker F 
TWA(B)-1 VMS Manager  F 
SOCIAL CARE B 
 
  
SC(B)-1 Head of Business Management Services M 
SC(B)-2 Business Support Manager F 
SC(B)-3 Assistant Director for Social Work  F 
SC(B)-4 Head of Commissioning and Procurement (community based 
services) 
F 
SC(B)-5 Procurement Manager F 
SC(B)-6 Operational Manager (intensive home-care service) M 
SC(B)-7 Head of Residential Services for Older People F 
SC(B)-8 Frontline Manager (Child Protection) F 
SC(B)-9  Agency worker F 
TWA(C)-1  Team Manager  F 
SOCIAL CARE C    
SC(C)-1 Recruitment and Contracts Manager F 
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SC(C)-2 Deputy Recruitment Manager F 
SC(C)-3 HR Manager M 
SC(C)-4 Corporate Procurement Manager M 
SC(C)-5 Children and Social Care Officer F 
SC(C)-6 Team Manager (Child Protection) F 
SC(C)-7 Line Manager (Children in Need Team)  F 
SC(C)-8 Project Manager F 
SC(C)-9 Project Manager M 
TWA(B)-2  Business Development Manager  M 
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Figure 1: Process model of client-side involvement in HRM of agency workers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Nature of 
agency worker’s 
job role (core, 
non-core) 
(b) Role played by 
TWAs (level and 
quality of HRM 
support provided) 
(c) Perceived 
need for client-
side HR 
interventions 
(d) Contract 
duration (long-
term, short-
term) 
(f) Regulatory 
environment 
(and how it is 
perceived) 
(g) Development of 
client-side HR 
practices for the 
management of 
agency workers 
(i) 
(ii) 
(e) Organizational 
conditions 
(competing cost 
control priorities) 
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